






How to Regulate Bitcoin? 







Bitcoin is a distributed system. The greatest dilemma it poses to the current legal and regulatory systems 
is that it is hardly possible to regulate a distributed network in a centralized fashion as decentralized 
permissionless blockchain-based cryptocurrencies are antithetical to the existing centralized structure 
of monetary and financial regulation. By shifting the policy debate from whether to regulate bitcoin and 
other decentralized cryptocurrencies to how to regulate them, this paper proposes a more nuanced policy 
recommendation for regulatory intervention in the cryptocurrency ecosystem. This policy approach 
relies on a decentralized regulatory architecture that is built upon the existing regulatory infrastructure 
and makes use of the existing as well as the emerging middlemen in the industry. It argues that instead 
of regulating the technology or the cryptocurrencies at the code or protocol layer, which might not be 
desirable, even if feasible, the regulation should target the applications and use-cases of 
cryptocurrencies. Such a regulatory strategy can best be implemented through directing the edicts and 
interdictions of regulation towards the middlemen, and can be enforced by the existing financial market 
participants and traditional gatekeepers such as banks, payment service providers and exchanges, as 
well as new emerging participants, such as large and centralized node operators and miners that are 
likely to replicate the functions of the traditional gatekeepers. 
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Introduction 
A decade after the launch of the first cryptocurrency, regulators are waking up to the potential costs and 
benefits of this arguably transformative technology. Unlike most of the earlier innovations in financial 
technology (fintech), which focused on making marginal improvements in the financial system by 
improving market frictions, cryptocurrencies aim to bring about a paradigm shift in the monetary and 
financial systems by removing trust in third parties and replacing it with cryptographic proof.1 Despite 
ebbs and flows, and peaks and troughs, Bitcoin has managed to achieve relative success in placing itself 
as a store of value – despite being a volatile one - and a niche medium of exchange in a relatively short 
period of time.2  
In the banking and monetary systems, cryptocurrencies’ promise of decentralization is to be achieved 
by disintermediating middlemen that used to be gatekeepers in the financial markets, such as banks and 
a chain of intermediaries in the cross-border fund transfer business (e.g., correspondent banking and 
remittances).3 This disintermediation poses a specific challenge to the regulation of cryptocurrencies as 
the traditional methods of financial regulation are mainly reliant on either the direct regulation of 
activities, entities, and instruments or the regulation of the middlemen and gatekeepers. However, 
despite achieving certain degrees of disintermediation and the reduced role of intermediaries in 
payments and a number of other financial transactions, cryptocurrencies have created various forms of 
new middlemen. This provides new opportunities for financial regulators to focus on these new 
intermediaries to regulate cryptocurrencies. This paper highlights the role of these middlemen and will 
argue that the regulatory focus should be shifted from regulating the protocol or outright interdictions 
placed on cryptocurrency transactions, which could have several unintended consequences, to 
regulating those middlemen who will most likely take the role of new gatekeepers. This model of 
regulation is more likely to be successful in addressing the emerging risks of cryptocurrencies. 
As bitcoin and other decentralized cryptocurrencies are open-source protocols, the regulation should 
not target them as there are several practical impediments for regulation of decentralized open-source 
technologies that would render their centralized direct regulation infeasible. This means that the 
traditional approach to regulation, which is mainly built on centralized command-and-control 
techniques may not be a successful regulatory strategy when it comes to regulating decentralized 
cryptocurrencies. Instead, it seems that the interface between the real and the virtual or the interface 
between the financial institutions and cryptocurrencies should be the target at which the regulation is 
                                                 
1 Satoshi Nakamoto, "Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System," (2008). For the importance of bitcoin and how it fits 
within and differs from other types of money in the financial system, see Hossein Nabilou and André Prüm, "Ignorance, Debt 
and Cryptocurrencies: The Old and the New in the Law and Economics of Concurrent Currencies," Journal of Financial 
Regulation 5, no. 1 (2019). 
2 However, the jury is still out on the success or failure of such a grand ambition. 
3 For the instances of failure of gatekeepers in conducting their semi-regulatory functions, see Jennifer Payne, "The Role of 
Gatekeepers," in The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation, ed. Niamh Moloney, Eilís Ferran, and Jennifer Payne 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
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aimed. Within this decentralized approach, it is of utmost importance to focus on the incentives of the 
participants in both the cryptocurrency ecosystem and the banking and financial system and deploy 
mechanisms that are incentive-compatible and capture resistant. 
This paper sheds some light on the legal and regulatory aspects of cryptocurrency ecosystems and 
provides a conceptual framework for analyzing and deploying the future regulation of cryptocurrencies. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The first section illustrates the conceptual differences between 
centralized direct regulation and decentralized indirect regulation of cryptocurrencies. Second, the 
paper will spell out the limitations and potential drawbacks of the direct and centralized regulation of 
cryptocurrencies. Third, the paper turns to searching for a cogent, coherent and more importantly 
feasible approach by relying on methods for regulating cryptocurrencies in a decentralized fashion 
through banks and payment systems. Finally, the paper closes with concluding remarks. 
This paper studies the regulation of cryptocurrencies, in particular, bitcoin, within the current monetary, 
banking and financial regulatory framework from a financial law or law-and-finance perspective. The 
literature on law and technology will be used only to the extent necessary to serve the objectives of the 
paper. 
In search of a coherent regulatory strategy 
In the tradition of the classic rationale for regulation, which is based on market failure, the regulation 
of cryptocurrencies would begin where the market fails.4 Among different sources of market failure, 
modern regulation of banking and finance puts special emphasis on the regulation of potential 
externalities of financial activities and mainly focuses on risk-based regulation that tends to minimize 
the potential risks or externalities. Within the cryptocurrency ecosystem, it appears that a great majority 
of externalities of cryptocurrencies emerge where they interact with the real world. For example, such 
                                                 
44 Although this paper finds several instances of market failures, even in the absence of market failures, there would be a need 
for regulatory intervention to facilitate the evolution of the cryptocurrency ecosystem through standardization and perhaps 
requirements for interoperability and open Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) - a design-based regulatory 
intervention - as adopted in the Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 
2015 on payment services in the internal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and 
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC, OJ L 337, 23.12.2015 (Also known as the Payment 
Services Directive or PSD2). 
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risks include concerns about fraud,5 market manipulation,6 financial crime,7 consumer protection,8 
liability issues in distributed ledgers,9 the development of large closed networks that can potentially 
create barriers to entry,10 concerns about taxation policy for cryptocurrencies,11 monetary policy,12 and 
financial stability.13 Further risks may arise from the lack of common standards and interoperability, 
governance issues,14 privacy concerns,15 scalability,16 and potential risks in the issuance of central bank 
digital currency (CBDC) or digital base money (DBM).17 As the nature of these risks suggests, they 
arise from the interactions between the virtual and the real. As such an interaction is often made possible 
by a new class of emerging middlemen, the regulation can minimize risks by focusing on the middlemen 
who facilitate the interaction between the real economy and the cryptocurrency markets.  
Such multi-faceted challenges, coupled with cryptocurrencies’ price volatility and their hybrid nature, 
which allows them to be used as a means of payment,18 investment,19 and access,20 have led to a surge 
of interest in studying the potential venues for regulating cryptocurrencies among regulators ranging 
from financial crime enforcement agencies to banking, securities and commodity markets regulators.21 
However, these studies were mainly concerned with initial coin offerings (ICOs) enabled by the 
                                                 
5 Massimo Bartoletti et al., "Dissecting Ponzi Schemes on Ethereum: Identification, Analysis, and Impact,"  (2017).; Financial 
Stability Oversight Council, "Financial Stability Oversight Council (Fsoc) 2016 Annual Report," (Washington, D.C.: Financial 
Stability Oversight Council, 2016), 127. 
6 Anonymous (32E3690D50B3B477DF7841212D4BB938DC9CDB50307618328E7F8B53F37CC1E2), "Quantifying the 
Effect of Tether," (January 24, 2018).; John M Griffin and Amin Shams, "Is Bitcoin Really Un-Tethered?," SSRN Working 
Paper Series  (2018). 
7 Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, "Cryptocurrency and Virtual Currency: Corruption and Money Laundering/Terrorism 
Financing Risks?," in Handbook of Digital Currency: Bitcoin, Innovation, Financial Instruments, and Big Data, ed. David 
Lee Kuo Chuen (San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 2015).; Robert Stokes, "Virtual Money Laundering: The Case of Bitcoin 
and the Linden Dollar," Information & Communications Technology Law 21, no. 3 (2012). See also Office of the New York 
State Attorney General, "Virtual Markets Integrity Initiative Report," (September 18, 2018). 
8 Dong He et al., "Virtual Currencies and Beyond: Initial Considerations," (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 
2016), 28-29. 
9 Dirk A Zetzsche, Ross P Buckley, and Douglas W Arner, "The Distributed Liability of Distributed Ledgers: Legal Risks of 
Blockchain," University of Illinois Law Review (forthcoming)  (2017). 
10 Dong He et al., "Fintech and Financial Services: Initial Considerations," IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN/17/05  (2017). 
11 Aleksandra Bal, "How to Tax Bitcoin?," in Handbook of Digital Currency: Bitcoin, Innovation, Financial Instruments, and 
Big Data, ed. David Lee Kuo Chuen (San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 2015). 
12 Christine Lagarde, "Central Banking and Fintech—a Brave New World?," Bank of England conference, London  (September 
29, 2017). 
13 Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures, "Digital Currencies," (Basel: Bank for International Settlements, 2015), 
15-16.; Financial Stability Board, "Crypto-Asset Markets: Potential Channels for Future Financial Stability Implications," 
(Basel: Financial Stability Board, 10 October 2018). 
14 Aaron  van Wirdum, "A Primer on Bitcoin Governance, or Why Developers Aren’t in Charge of the Protocol," Bitcoin 
MagazineSept. 7, 2016. 
15 Primavera De Filippi, "The Interplay between Decentralization and Privacy: The Case of Blockchain Technologies,"  (2016). 
16 European Securities and Markets Authority, "The Distributed Ledger Technology Applied to Securities Markets," (Paris: 
European Securities and Markets Authority, 2017), 2. See also Huw Van Steenis et al., "Global Insight: Blockchain in Banking: 
Disruptive Threat or Tool?," in Morgan Stanley Research Report (New York: Morgan Stanely, 2016). 
17 See Hossein Nabilou, "Central Bank Digital Currencies: Preliminary Legal Observations," SSRN Working Paper Series  
(2019).; Yves Mersch, "Digital Base Money: An Assessment from the Ecb’s Perspective," in Speech at the Farewell ceremony 
for Pentti Hakkarainen, Deputy Governor of Suomen Pankki – Finlands Bank, Helsinki (16 January 2017).; Aleksander 
Berentsen and Fabian Schar, "The Case for Central Bank Electronic Money and the Non-Case for Central Bank 
Cryptocurrencies," Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review  (2018).; Morgan Ricks, "Money as Infrastructure," Vanderbilt 
Law Research Paper No. 17-63  (2018). 
18 Primarily known as ‘cryptocurrencies’ 
19 Also known as ‘security tokens’ 
20 Also known as ‘utility tokens’ 
21 European Securities and Markets Authority, "The Distributed Ledger Technology Applied to Securities Markets." 
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distributed ledger technologies (DLTs), blockchain and cryptocurrencies22 and potential risks and 
rewards of the blockchain technology. Several studies by the European Central Bank (ECB),23 the 
European Banking Authority (EBA),24 the International Monetary Fund (IMF),25 the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS),26 the US Federal Reserve and its regional banks27 about the costs and 
benefits of cryptocurrencies have been conducted. In addition, there is a burgeoning literature on the 
economic, monetary and financial aspects of cryptocurrencies as they relate to central bank digital 
currencies.28 Nevertheless, the legal aspects of cryptocurrencies and in particular the debate about how 
to regulate decentralized cryptocurrencies remain under-investigated. This paper is an attempt to narrow 
this gap. 
As of this writing, due to the complexities and uncertainties as to the possible future developments of 
evolving cryptocurrency ecosystems, policymakers and regulators of major jurisdictions have taken a 
relatively hands-off, wait-and-see approach to regulating such currencies. Where regulators erred on 
the side of banning or bashing cryptocurrencies, they have faced classical problems of regulatory 
competition and regulatory arbitrage, i.e., the migration of the industry from their jurisdiction to more 
welcoming ones or migration of activities to underground or black markets.  
                                                 
22 European Securities and Markets Authority, "Advice: Initial Coin Offerings and Crypto-Assets,"  (9 January 2019). 
23 European Central Bank, "Virtual Currency Schemes," (Frankfurt an Main: European Central Bank, October 2012).; 
European Central Bank, "Virtual Currency Schemes- a Further Analysis,"  (2015).; European Central Bank, "The Potential 
Impact of Dlts on Securities Post-Trading Harmonisation and on the Wider Eu Financial Market Integration," (Frankfurt am 
MainSeptember 2017).; Andrea Pinna and Wiebe Ruttenberg, "Distributed Ledger Technologies in Securities Post-Trading: 
Revolution or Evolution?," ECB Occasional Paper Series No 172  (2016). 
24 European Banking Authority, "Eba Opinion on 'Virtual Currencies'," (London: European Banking Authority, 4 July 2014).; 
European Banking Authority, "Report with Advice for the European Commission on Crypto-Assets," (9 January 2019). 
25 Dong He et al., "Virtual Currencies and Beyond: Initial Considerations."; Tommaso Mancini-Griffoli et al., "Casting Light 
on Central Bank Digital Currency," IMF Staff Discussion Note No. 18/08  (2018). 
26 Morten Bech and Rodney Grarratt, "Central Bank Cryptocurrencies," BIS Quarterly Review  (2017).; Committee on 
Payments and Market Infrastructures, "Digital Currencies."; Bank for International Settlements, "Cryptocurrencies: Looking 
Beyond the Hype," in Annual Economic Report (Basel2018).; Christian Barontini and Henry Holden, "Proceeding with 
Caution - a Survey of Central Bank Digital Currency," BIS Papers No 101  (January 2019).; Raphael Auer, "Beyond the 
Doomsday Economics of "Proof-of-Work" in Cryptocurrencies," BIS Working Papers No 765  (2019).  
27 Gina C. Pieters, "The Potential Impact of Decentralized Virtual Currency on Monetary Policy," Federal Reserve Bank of 
Dallas Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute 2016 Annual Report  (2017).; Alexander Kroeger and Asani Sarkar to 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Liberty Street Economics, June 27, 2017, 2016, 
http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2016/03/is-bitcoin-really-frictionless.html.; Aleksander Berentsen and Fabian 
Schär, "A Short Introduction to the World of Cryptocurrencies," Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 100, no. 1 (First 
Quarter 2018).; Aleksander Berentsen and Fabian Schar, "The Case for Central Bank Electronic Money and the Non-Case for 
Central Bank Cryptocurrencies."; David Mills et al., "Distributed Ledger Technology in Payments, Clearing, and Settlement," 
Finance and Economics Discussion Series Divisions of Research & Statistics and Monetary Affairs, Federal Reserve Board  
(2016). 
28 JP Koning, "Fedcoin," Moneyness April 11, 2018 (October 19, 2014).; David Andolfatto, "Fedcoin: On the Desirability of 
a Government Cryptocurrency," MacroMania 2018 (February 03, 2015).; Sahil Gupta, Patrick Lauppe, and Shreyas 
Ravishankar, "Fedcoin: A Blockchain-Backed Central Bank Cryptocurrency,"  (2017).; Morten Bech and Rodney Grarratt, 
"Central Bank Cryptocurrencies."; Michael Kumhof and Clare Noone, "Central Bank Digital Currencies — Design Principles 
and Balance Sheet Implications," Bank of England Staff Working Paper No. 725  (2018).; John Barrdear and Michael Kumhof, 
"The Macroeconomics of Central Bank Issued Digital Currencies," Bank of England Staff Working Paper No. 605  (2016).; 
Michael D Bordo and Andrew T Levin, "Central Bank Digital Currency and the Future of Monetary Policy," (National Bureau 
of Economic Research, 2017).; Aleksander Berentsen and Fabian Schar, "The Case for Central Bank Electronic Money and 
the Non-Case for Central Bank Cryptocurrencies."; Eswar Prasad, "Central Banking in a Digital Age: Stock-Taking and 
Preliminary Thoughts," Hutchins Center on Fiscal & Monetary Policy at Brookings  (April 2018).; Larry White, "The World's 
First Central Bank Electronic Money Has Come – and Gone: Ecuador, 2014-2018," Alt-M: Ideas for an Alternative Monetary 
Future  (March 29, 2018). 
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It seems that such sporadic regulatory efforts have at best been counterproductive and there is a need 
for a more systematic regulatory approach to minimizing the risks of such decentralized 
cryptocurrencies, where the market fails to do so. To address market failures or effect behavioral 
changes in the objects of regulation in the financial markets, aside from harnessing self-regulatory 
mechanisms by making use of financial market participants, regulators often employ two overarching 
regulatory instruments: command-and-control instruments and economic instruments. Command-and-
control instruments are the most traditional and intrusive method of effecting a behavioral change in 
the subjects of regulation. A command is ‘an order backed by threats’,29 the non-compliance or violation 
of which triggers coercive sanctions by the state. In this method of regulation, the law uses its traditional 
aspect through rules to pursue certain policy objectives. Command-and-control techniques often rely 
on direct regulation approach. Direct regulation refers to regulatory measures focusing immediately on 
the regulation of the industry itself as a discrete activity30 or on the activities immediately performed 
by business entities, targeting the industry’s structure, strategies, and operations. Accordingly, the direct 
regulation of cryptocurrencies would involve regulating the code or protocol (i.e., design-based 
regulation), developers,31 the design features of the blockchain itself, wallet providers, node operators, 
miners, and users, or engaging in legislation and rule making that govern white papers.  
In contrast, indirect regulation constitutes “market discipline-inspired regulatory measures largely 
targeting the creditors and counterparties” of those entities.32 It often utilizes an intermediary to transmit 
the imperatives or commands to the (primarily intended) regulated entity or activity that is the ultimate 
target.33 Indirect regulation is often viewed as a more efficient strategy in financial regulation in the 
presence of suitable ‘surrogate regulators’.34 For example, regulation of exchanges, where 
cryptocurrencies are exchanged for fiat money, custodians and other service providers, such as 
merchant acceptance facilities and in some instances, wallet providers, would belong to the realm of 
indirect regulation. This paper advocates an indirect regulatory approach to regulating cryptocurrencies 
that relies on economic instruments. As will be demonstrated in the paper, such a regulatory approach 
would harbinger certain degrees of decentralization in addressing the challenges of cryptocurrencies. 
                                                 
29 See: H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 16. For a classic definition of 
the command which Hart bases his attack on the account of law based on that definition, see John Austin, The Province of 
Jurisprudence Determined (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 18-37. 
30 Phoebus Athanassiou, Hedge Fund Regulation in the European Union: Current Trends and Future Prospects (Alphen aan 
den Rijn (The Netherlands): Kluwer Law International, 2009), 227. For the application of the concept of direct and indirect 
regulation in the regulation of the hedge fund industry, see Hossein Nabilou and Alessio M. Pacces, "The Hedge Fund 
Regulation Dilemma: Direct Vs. Indirect Regulation," William & Mary Business Law Review 6, no. I (2015). 
31 Angela Walch, "In Code(Rs) We Trust: Software Developers as Fiduciaries in Public Blockchains," in Regulating 
Blockchain: Techno-Social and Legal Challenges, ed. Philipp  Hacker, et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Forthcoming 
2019). For an different view, see: Aaron  van Wirdum, "A Primer on Bitcoin Governance, or Why Developers Aren’t in Charge 
of the Protocol," BITCOINMAGAZINESept. 7, 2016.; Jerry Brito and Peter van Valkenburgh, "Writing and Publishing Code 
Alone Cannot Be a Crime," CoinCenter.org  (Octover 29, 2018). 
32 Phoebus Athanassiou, Hedge Fund Regulation in the European Union: Current Trends and Future Prospects, 227.  
33 Ibid., 227-28 & 34. 
34 Hossein Nabilou and Alessio M. Pacces, "The Hedge Fund Regulation Dilemma: Direct Vs. Indirect Regulation." 
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Centralized direct regulation 
For tokens issued on permissioned or restricted distributed ledgers, the regulation would be 
straightforward, as it can target the proprietors of the ledger or the nodes with the access to and the 
authority of validating it. For centralized cryptocurrencies, relying on direct regulation using command-
and-control techniques would be successful in achieving regulatory objectives. Such techniques may 
include mandatory creation of a scheme governance authority (body), Information Technology (IT) 
security requirements, and requirements on transaction verification process (e.g., the number of nodes 
and miners and confirmations needed for the finality of a transaction on the blockchain) can be imposed 
by law to be built into the design of a given cryptocurrency. Operational and business continuity 
requirements, requirements such as investor or user vetting process or customer due diligence before 
making the wallet or coin available to the user can be imposed directly on these identifiable scheme 
authorities. Therefore, centralized cryptocurrencies would not necessarily require any reorganization in 
the structure of financial regulation.  
Another example of direct regulation of the cryptocurrency markets may involve central banking. Such 
direct involvement by central banks may be due to the concerns about potential impairment of the unit 
of account (i.e., central banks’ monopoly over issuing banknotes), price stability or their mandate in 
implementing monetary policy. An example of this type of intervention may include banning 
cryptocurrency exchanges, financial institutions, and payment processors from handling or dealing in 
cryptocurrencies by central banks or other competent authorities.35 On the other extreme of the 
spectrum, the central bankers may be given the power to hold cryptocurrencies. For example, in the 
case of the ECB, this can be done as part of its tasks under conducting foreign-exchange operations or 
holding and managing the official foreign reserves of the Member States. As the ECB and NCBs can 
“acquire and sell spot and forward all types of foreign exchange assets and precious metals”,36 and as 
‘foreign exchange assets’ include “securities and all other assets in the currency of any country or units 
of account and in whatever form held”,37 it would be difficult to argue that the ECB would not have the 
power to acquire and hold cryptocurrencies if need be. 
Alternatively, a centralized direct regulation approach can rely on economic instruments. Economic 
instruments are regulatory tools and techniques that are designed to harness market discipline and to 
achieve behavioral changes or policy objectives by making use of the competitive forces and ‘financial 
self-interests of market actors’.38 Examples of such instruments are charges (fines), taxes, subsidies, 
                                                 
35 Global Legal Research Directorate Staff of the Library of Congress, "Regulation of Cryptocurrency in Selected 
Jurisdictions," (Washington D.C.,: The Law Library of Congress, June 2018). See China entry by Laney Zhang. 
36 Art. 23 the Protocol (no 4) on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank 
(hereinafter, ESCB/ECB Statute). 
37 Art. 23 ESCB/ECB Statute 
38 Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung, An Introduction to Law and Regulation: Texts and Materials (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 315. 
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tradable permits, changes in liability rules and property rights.39 For example, designating 
cryptocurrencies as property for tax purposes and imposing property taxes each time a bitcoin or a 
fraction of it changes hands is an economic instrument that could severely stifle bitcoin adoption as a 
medium of exchange.  
An additional tool for direct regulation of cryptocurrencies may be the design-based regulation40 
Design-based regulation has historically been one of the main regulatory measures in regulating 
financial markets.41 In contrast to other modalities of regulation,42 which rely on rational human 
reasoning, design-based regulation seeks to “eliminate undesirable behaviour by designing out the 
possibility for its occurrence.” The objective is to remove the possibility of non-compliance by 
eliminating the possibility for the application of human discretion in its entirety.43 This approach has a 
variety of applications in the regulation of cyberspace. In this perspective, the code is the architectural 
alternative for the deployment of legal rules.44 In other words, design-based regulation creates “a 
‘structure’ that will organize, constrain and channel activity.”45 
The difference between legal codes and computer codes is that legal codes are extrinsic. Namely, these 
codes can easily be breached, however, the consequences of such a breach is the sanction that ensures 
the compliance ex-post. However, the technical codes or computer codes are intrinsic, namely, in case 
of the violation of such rules, no further activities would be possible.46 In other words, the code self-
enforces the protocols set by the code. For example, in smart contracts, the contract design accumulates 
                                                 
39 Ibid., 85. Economic instruments, are classified into four main regulatory modalities; competition, consensus, communication 
and code (or architecture) according to the underlying ‘modality’ of control through which the behavior of regulated entities 
is shaped. Ibid., 9 & 80. Except code or architecture other regulatory modalities often rely on the economic instruments and 
use indirect regulation to achieve their objectives. 
40 Design-based regulation is also called structural regulation, code-based or architecture-based regulation and sometimes 
techno-regulation. 
41 See Hossein Nabilou, "Bank Proprietary Trading and Investment in Private Funds: Is the Volcker Rule a Panacea or yet 
Another Maginot Line?," Banking and Finance Law Review 32, no. 2 (2017). 
42 For a discussion of such modalities, see Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung, An Introduction to Law and Regulation: Texts 
and Materials, 9 & 80. 
43 Ibid., 102. Although in the eyes of some authors it seems that the design-based regulation has the promise of one hundred 
percent effectiveness, going as far as arguing that the ‘‘[l]aw as code is a start to the perfect technology of justice”. (Lawrence 
Lessig, "The Zones of Cyberspace," Stanford Law Review 48 (1996): 1408.), Others identify certain reasons for the failure of 
such mechanisms. Particularly, Yeung argues that “[t]hose which operate by promoting behavioural change, or seek to change 
the impact of existing behaviour, are more vulnerable to failure than those which do not. And those which override individual 
behaviour are the most effective of all.” See Karen Yeung, "Towards an Understanding of Regulation by Design," in 
Regulating Technologies: Legal Futures, Regulatory Frames and Technological Fixes, ed. Roger Brownsword and Karen 
Yeung (Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2008), 80 & 106. 
44 Lawrence Lessig, Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York: Basic Books, 1999). Examples of design-based rules 
abound. Benthamite panopticon is one of the earliest examples of the use of design-based techniques in law enforcement. See 
Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New Yrok: Vintage Books, 1995), 195-228. The ubiquitous 
use of speed humps is another example. The idea of separation of powers (See John C. Coates IV, "The Volcker Rule as 
Structural Law: Implications for Cost–Benefit Analysis and Administrative Law," Capital Markets Law Journal 10, no. 4 
(2015): 449.) and even locating constitutional courts away from the seat of the legislative and the executive branches of 
government in some European countries with the aim of ensuring judicial independence is another example of design-based 
regulation. See Lawrence Lessig, Code: Version 2.0 (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 127-28. 
45 John C. Coates IV, "The Volcker Rule as Structural Law: Implications for Cost–Benefit Analysis and Administrative Law," 
448. 
46 Peter Yeoh, "Regulatory Issues in Blockchain Technology," Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance 25, no. 2 
(2017): 200. 
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the legislation, enforcement, and adjudication at one stage under the control of the coder that eliminates 
the possibility of a breach, hence dispensing with further stages that are to ensure compliance.47 
Crafting design-based regulation in the cryptocurrency ecosystem cannot be independent of the specific 
features of the cryptocurrency in question and its underlying blockchain. For example, cryptocurrencies 
based on an unrestricted (permissionless) blockchain are to be treated differently from those built on a 
restricted (permissioned) blockchain with identifiable and relatively centralized nodes. In the same vein, 
centralized cryptocurrency schemes should be treated differently from decentralized ones such as 
bitcoin. Given the number and variety of cryptocurrencies, designing tailor-made regulations for such 
currencies would prove to be an insurmountable barrier for regulators and would render it dysfunctional.  
Within the direct regulatory approach, to increase the efficiency of regulation, regulators can also 
consider a laddered approach to regulating cryptocurrencies. For example, thus far, regulatory 
intervention in cryptocurrency markets has been limited to moral suasion, i.e., using information 
provision to users and investors to raise awareness of the risks of cryptocurrencies, such as issuing 
public warnings and publishing research papers. Another manifestation of the laddered approach would 
be to focus on the market capitalization of cryptocurrencies and directly regulating the ones that pass 
certain thresholds in terms of size. In its extreme, the regulator would ban cryptocurrencies by imposing 
a ban on the use of cryptocurrency schemes and imposing a fine on cryptocurrency-based financial 
activities, exchanges or acceptance facilities.48 
The greatest challenge to the direct regulation of cryptocurrencies lies in the fact that some of the largest 
cryptocurrencies are decentralized and designed to be censorship-resistant. In the absence of a 
centralized governance scheme, it is hard to propose a direct regulatory approach to regulating 
decentralized cryptocurrencies.49 The closest that regulation can get in regulating such cryptocurrencies 
is regulating miners, and perhaps relatively centralized nodes on the Lightning Network.50 However, 
given the geographic distribution of the miners and nodes in the decentralized network, such a 
regulatory approach would face barriers that could be hard to overcome. Therefore, the regulation would 
better focus on the applications, use-cases, and businesses that are being developed around these open 
source cryptocurrency protocols.51 As the second-layer solutions are being developed, it is reasonable 
                                                 
47 However, economists typically view the law as a set of official prices. See: Robert Cooter, "Prices and Sanctions," Columbia 
law review 84, no. 6 (1984). In this sense, the application of smart contracts would not be optimal in all contractual 
relationships, as they eliminate the opportunity for negotiations in cases of (efficient) breaches. 
48 Daniel Broby and Samuel Baker, "Central Banks and Cryptocurrencies," Centre for Financial Regulation and Innovation - 
White Paper  (2018): 11. 
49 Yves Mersch, "Virtual Currencies Ante Portas," Speech at the 39th meeting of the Governor’s Club Bodrum, Turkey,14 May 
2018  (14 May 2018). 
50 Joseph Poon and Thaddeus Dryja, "The Bitcoin Lightning Network: Scalable Off-Chain Instant Payments,"  (2016). 
51 For similar ideas see: Michèle Finck, "Blockchains: Regulating the Unknown," German Law Journal 19, no. 4 (2018): 689.; 
Julie Maupin, "Mapping the Global Legal Landscape of Blockchain and Other Distributed Ledger Technologies," Centre for 
International Governance Innovation Papaers No. 149  (2017). 
There are improvements on Bitcoin protocol and also second layer solutions that promise to make bitcoin useful for all the 
above-mentioned purposes. For an overview of two such business improvements called “market exchange pricing”, and 
“instantaneous exchange facilities”, see William Luther and Lawrence White, "Can Bitcoin Become a Major Currency?," JMU 
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to expect business communities being developed around them which could be directly identifiable and 
targeted by regulators. 
However, this is not to say that direct regulation of cryptocurrencies would be completely ineffective. 
Although governments can hardly do away with decentralized cryptocurrencies, they can disrupt their 
growth. As with all currencies, the success of any currency depends on its widespread adoption, which 
entails network effects. Putting a ban on cryptocurrencies by governments can severely undermine their 
network effects.52 In addition, aggressive tax policy as part of the direct economic instruments, such as 
designating bitcoin as property for tax purposes and imposing property taxes each time a bitcoin or a 
fraction of it changes hands, as is being practiced in some jurisdictions, would severely stifle its 
adoption as a medium of exchange. However, the problem with a hard-touch regulatory approach is 
regulatory arbitrage. First, due to the distributed nature of bitcoin, no government can entirely and 
effectively ban or tax bitcoin away. And it is likely that a legal interdiction will only push bitcoin 
transactions to the darker corners of finance. Second, if only a few jurisdictions allow bitcoin 
transactions, such a ban would become ineffective because of regulatory arbitrage. 
This paper argues that the best strategy for regulating cryptocurrencies is an indirect approach that 
makes use of economic instruments. After studying the impediments to the direct regulation of 
cryptocurrencies, the paper turns to the promises of the decentralized indirect regulation in the next 
sections. This indirect approach will heavily rely on the role of a network of decentralized market 
participants to address the challenges of cryptocurrencies.  
Challenges to direct regulation 
Centralized direct regulation of cryptocurrencies may face the same challenges that the traditional 
command-and-control regulation does. The main challenge concerns the Hayekian knowledge 
problem.53 Traditional centralized regulation assumes that the government has the perfect knowledge 
to identify the causes of the problems and would have the complete knowledge and mastery of the 
regulatory instruments to design the best solutions to achieve its goals. And above all, it assumes that 
the government has the tools and resources to implement, and spot non-compliance, in particular, where 
the regulated industry is not sufficiently motivated to comply with such rules.54 From among all the 
                                                 
Working Paper in Economics No. 14-17  (2014). See also Jimmy Song, "Bits Denomination Bip," GitHub, 
https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0176.mediawiki. 
52 William J. Luther, "Cryptocurrencies, Network Effects, and Switching Costs," Contemporary Economic Policy 34, no. 3 
(2016). (Luther believes that governments are capable of undermining bitcoin due to their ability to stifle network effects. He 
believes that in the absence of a major breakthroughs, it is unlikely that bitcoin would gain widespread adoption.) On the other 
side of the spectrum, some believe that profit seeking incentives of entrepreneurs can contribute to the widespread adoption 
of bitcoin. See Malavika Nair and Nicolás Cachanosky, "Bitcoin and Entrepreneurship: Breaking the Network Effect," The 
Review of Austrian Economics 30, no. 3 (2017). 
53 F. A. Hayek, "The Use of Knowledge in Society," The American Economic Review 35, no. 4 (1945). 
54 Julia Black, "Decentring Regulation: The Role of Regulation and Self Regulation in a ‘‘Post Regulatory’’ World," Current 
Legal Problems 54, no. 1 (2001): 106. 
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challenges that centralized direct regulatory approaches face, three stand out in regulating 
cryptocurrencies: limitations on the competence of public authorities, identifying the regulated entities, 
and regulatory arbitrage. 
Limitations on competence 
One of the greatest challenges to regulating cryptocurrencies is that policymakers would lack 
competence over regulating cryptocurrencies. The basic principles of public and constitutional law 
imply that public entities, including regulators, have limited and enumerated powers and once their 
conducts or actions do not fall within one of those enumerated powers, they would be considered ultra 
vires and unconstitutional. In multi-layered constitutional arrangements such as that of the EU and the 
euro area, the principles of conferral, subsidiarity, and proportionality impose additional limitations on 
the powers of the EU institutions, agencies, and bodies. To ensure the compliance with this general 
principle, the regulators’ acts and omissions intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties are 
often made subject to judicial review.55 For example, the supervisory competences of the ECB are 
limited to the prudential supervision of credit institutions within the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
(SSM) and the oversight of the payment system. Thus, the ECB can only intervene in the cryptocurrency 
markets if the cryptocurrencies threaten the stability of the payment or the banking systems. Therefore, 
the only option available for certain regulators, such as the ECB, is to indirectly supervise the 
cryptocurrency ecosystem through the banking system.  
The question of regulatory competence and who should regulate cryptocurrencies depends on the 
approach to financial regulation as well. Although it is hard to shoehorn all financial regulatory systems 
in specific categories, at least four different approaches to the structure of financial regulation exist 
worldwide. These include the institutional, functional, integrated, and twin-peaks approaches.56 Despite 
their striking similarity to structural approaches, some financial regulatory and supervisory structures 
such as that of the US does not fit into any of the above categories. It is, however, a mix of functional 
and institutional approaches.57 The same applies to the EU which looks like a mix of institutional and 
twin-peaks approaches. Since cryptocurrencies cut across the traditional competences of various 
regulators and jurisdictions, they make the traditional classifications in the regulatory and supervisory 
                                                 
55 See for example: Article 263 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and Article 35.1 of the ESCB/ECB 
Statute. 
56 Working Group on Financial Supervision The Group of Thirty, "The Structure of Financial Supervision: Approaches and 
Challenges in a Global Marketplace," (Washington, DC2008), 12-14. For a review of structures of financial regulation, see M. 
Taylor, "Institutional Structures of Regulation," in Handbook of Safeguarding Global Financial Stability: Political, Social, 
Cultural, and Economic Theories and Models, ed. Gerard  Caprio Jr. (London: Elsevier Inc., 2013).; Heidi Mandanis Schooner 
and Michael W. Taylor, Regulation of Global Banking: Principles and Policies (Academic Press, 2010), 259-77. 
57 Working Group on Financial Supervision The Group of Thirty, "The Structure of Financial Supervision: Approaches and 
Challenges in a Global Marketplace," 12-14. A move from institutional and functional regime towards a modified Twin Peaks 
Approach is recommended for the US regulatory regime. See Treasury The Department of the, "Blueprint for a Modernized 
Financial Regulatory Structure," (2008). 
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tasks virtually obsolete.58 In many jurisdictions, as traditional financial institutions, instruments, and 
activities are supervised by different financial regulators, cryptocurrencies - given their hybrid nature 
(i.e., currency, commodity, security) - are regulated by different financial markets authorities. It looks 
like each financial regulator depending on its existing mandate and fields of competences has engaged 
in regulation or supervision of the cryptocurrency ecosystem.59 
The origin of this controversy lies also in the nature of cryptocurrencies, their hybrid use-cases, and the 
fact that regulators are yet to come to a final conclusion on classifying cryptoassets.60 Although the 
debate about the legal nature of cryptocurrencies has significant legal implications, thus far, it has 
produced no conclusive result. Since there is no consensus about the nature of cryptocurrencies among 
regulators,61 there is no uniform approach to regulating them,62 nor is there any consensus about who 
should regulate them. The major cryptocurrencies have hybrid nature and cannot be fit into one of the 
traditional categories of money (currency), security or commodity. From a regulatory perspective, 
policymakers have taken different stances on the nature of cryptocurrencies. Tax authorities have 
designated cryptocurrencies as property.63 Commodity markets authorities have viewed them as a 
commodity.64 Securities regulators have seen some of them as security,65 and regulators and supervisors 
in charge of money or financial crime have designated them as currency. Such a competence issue has 
been a constant concern for central banks and other regulatory agencies in dealing with cryptocurrencies 
and it constitutes a major roadblock to directly regulating cryptocurrencies particularly in the context 
of direct regulation. 
Regulators need to exercise the utmost caution in the legal categorization of cryptocurrencies, as a legal 
categorization is not simply a description of reality. In effect, such categorizations prescribe the legal 
nature of objects. This means that putting one object into a specific legal category often triggers a whole 
host of legal consequences,66 such as the determination of who should regulate that cryptocurrency. 
                                                 
58 Bank for International Settlements, "Cryptocurrencies: Looking Beyond the Hype," in Annual Economic Report (Basel, 
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61 See Commodity Futures Trading Commission, "In the Matter Of:  Coinflip, Inc., D/B/a Derivabit, and Francisco Riordan, 
Respondents: Order Instituting Proceedings Pursuant to Sections 6(C) and 6(D) of the Commodity Exchange Act, Making 
Findings and Imposing Remedial Sanctions (Cftc Docket No. 15-29)," (September 17, 2015).; Securities and Exchange 
Commission, "Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The Dao," 
(Washington, DCJuly 25, 2017). 
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Directorate Staff of the Library of Congress, "Regulation of Cryptocurrency in Selected Jurisdictions." 
63 See Phoebus Athanassiou, "Impact of Digital Innovation on the Processing of Electronic Payments and Contracting: An 
Overview of Legal Risks," ECB Legal Working Paper Series No 16  (Octover 2017): 22-24. 
64 Commodity Futures Trading Commission, "In the Matter Of:  Coinflip, Inc., D/B/a Derivabit, and Francisco Riordan, 
Respondents: Order Instituting Proceedings Pursuant to Sections 6(C) and 6(D) of the Commodity Exchange Act, Making 
Findings and Imposing Remedial Sanctions (Cftc Docket No. 15-29)." 
65 Securities and Exchange Commission, "Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934: The Dao." 
66 Rosa Maria Lastra and Jason Grant Allen, "Virtual Currencies in the Eurosystem: Challenges Ahead," (Brussels, Belgium: 
ECON Committee, European Parliament, 2018), 9. 
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Therefore, legal categorization should only be sought, after the full appreciation of the object and its 
complexities. 
Given the limited scope of the competences of the banking and payment regulators under the current 
regulatory framework, and as of the time of this writing, it seems that the regulation and supervision of 
cryptocurrencies by the banking regulators can only be in the form of indirect regulation. This means 
that it will mainly be conducted through their existing regulatory, supervisory and oversight tools that 
are conventionally exercised by the competent regulator over credit institutions and payment systems 
over which regulators have competence. In this view of regulation, although regulatory intervention 
may not touch the Bitcoin blockchain itself, it will apply at the use-case level,67 where the virtual comes 
into contact with the real.  
This is particularly important in the context of evolving smart contracts on cryptocurrency schemes, 
where the external validation of the factual events (e.g., the actual transfer of the personal property) is 
necessarily conducted by trusted intermediaries (i.e., oracles).68 Not only can the reliance on the oracles 
reduce the level of trustlessness of transaction on the blockchain – long advocated by cryptocurrency 
enthusiasts - but also they become choke points for the purposes of regulation, where the law can target 
blockchain transactions. Regulating cryptoassets at the use-case level is likely to follow the functional 
definition of that currency as the regulation is based on the use-cases rather than other more abstract 
concepts. 
No relevant responsible target institution 
The direct, centralized and command-and-control based regulation of cryptocurrencies, to the extent 
possible, would run into the practical question of what or whom to regulate. The main problem with 
regulating cryptocurrencies is that decentralized permissionless blockchain-based cryptocurrencies are 
antithetical to the existing structure of financial regulation. Such cryptocurrencies do not fit into any 
existing frameworks. There is no easily identifiable legal entity or person towards which the regulation 
could be directed. Their domicile could be on or offshore or would be impossible to locate.69 
Cryptocurrencies can also exist and function independently of the existing institutions and market 
infrastructures that makes taming them even more difficult.   
There are a plethora of actors playing distinct roles in the cryptocurrency sphere, such as developers, 
issuers, miners, processing service providers, users, wallet providers, exchanges, and other trading 
platforms such as decentralized exchanges, merchant acceptance facilities, and various other actors.70 
                                                 
67 Phoebus L. Athanassiou, Digital Innovation in Financial Services: Legal Challenges and Regulatory Policy Issues (Alphen 
aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International B.V., 2018), 38. 
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69 Office of the New York State Attorney General, "Virtual Markets Integrity Initiative Report." 
70 For a detailed description, see European Central Bank, "Virtual Currency Schemes- a Further Analysis," 7-8. 
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The issue becomes more complicated as some issuing organizations have neither managers nor real or 
corporate entity and place of domicile. Even in some cases, the identity of the developers is unknown. 
All these features mean that cryptocurrencies can best be regulated indirectly focusing on the regulation 
of the known financial institutions and implementing the regulation through such institutions.71 Indirect 
regulation of cryptocurrencies would circumvent all those difficult questions and instead relegate them 
to a network of decentralized banks and payment institutions to address those problems. This regulatory 
approach has proven to be successful in the sanctions regimes, where the sanctioned country has the 
utmost incentive to circumvent the sanctions and undermine their effectiveness. In sanctions regimes, 
where the activity in question is out of reach of the regulator, the regulator targets the industry upon 
which it has jurisdiction, and sanctions the transactions between the regulated entities and those outside 
its regulatory reach (also known as secondary boycotts).72 Drawing such parallels, warnings issued by 
regulators such as the European Banking Authority (EBA) urging banks that engage or plan to engage 
in cryptocurrency business not to do so can be considered as regulatory interventions of this nature.73 
To avoid the problems of direct regulation of the coders and the protocol, which could both be difficult 
in fact and on legal grounds, regulation of exchanges or identifiable wallet providers would be more 
suitable.74 The New York Bitlicense is a case in point where the businesses active in providing 
cryptocurrency services are the target of regulation.75 In this case, regulation targets the interface of 
cyberspace and the real world. This is in line with the old tradition in financial regulation where the 
regulation of financial markets and institutions has relied on gatekeepers. It seems that the regulation 
of cryptocurrencies is better to follow the same logic and focus on the institutions that are the point of 
converting cryptocurrencies to fiat currencies. In other words, the interface between cryptocurrencies 
and banks and payment institutions can be a point where the regulation can be targeted and deployed.76 
Additional venues for indirect regulation would be for the regulator to focus on regulating liquidity 
providers in cryptocurrencies, and imposing stricter collateral eligibility requirements on the acceptance 
of cryptocurrencies as collateral by financial intermediaries, including banning such practices.77 
However, even this type of regulation faces a few challenges, the most important of which was 
regulatory arbitrage, to which we return in the next section. 
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Regulatory arbitrage 
One important factor that plays a role in determining whom to regulate is the concerns about regulatory 
arbitrage. Regulatory arbitrage, broadly defined, refers to shifting activities from a heavily regulated 
financial sector to an unregulated or lightly regulated financial sector with the aim of maximizing profits 
by taking advantage of regulatory differentials.78 In doing so, it often “exploits the gap between the 
economic substance of a transaction and its legal or regulatory treatment.”79 In the absence of barriers, 
a firm that is free to choose between two jurisdictions with differential regulatory costs will engage in 
business at lower regulatory costs.80 
The relatively decentralized nature of cryptocurrencies and the young and nimble industries that are 
being evolved within this ecosystem create border problems81 and a wide scope for regulatory arbitrage 
across borders.82 In the cryptocurrency sphere, if a cryptocurrency is allowed only in one jurisdiction, 
it can spread across borders in the virtual environment and render the regulatory efforts of a single 
jurisdiction ineffective. This has already been the case in the regulator’s cat and mouse game in the area 
of illegal download websites and decentralized protocols for P2P file sharing such as BitTorrent.83 
Within such industries, due to the digital nature of the industry and its global reach, there is a possibility 
for regulatory arbitrage and a potential regulatory race to the bottom. Cryptocurrency regulation has not 
been an exception to this rule. For example, after the New York Bitlicense, there have been reports of 
businesses, including exchanges, that changed their domicile relatively quickly and with much ease 
unprecedented in the business history. In 2017, a year in which Bank of China took actions to regulate 
and ban ICOs, the cryptocurrencies ecosystem witnessed a shift in the global trading volume from 
Chinese Yuan (CNY) to Japanese Yen (JPY) and US dollar (USD). 
The second problem is that due to the P2P nature of these cryptocurrencies, banning or regulating them 
will presumably only push such currencies to the darker corners of the virtual world. Therefore, the 
problem of regulatory arbitrage itself again supports the case for an indirect regulatory approach, as it 
is far costlier for banks and other already regulated financial institutions to shift their business or 
relocate to less regulated jurisdictions. To be arbitrage-proof, regulation should, to the extent possible, 
link the mobile capital and elements of regulated firms to the immobile elements and impose regulation 
on immobile capital. In this way, the indirect regulation of cryptocurrencies targets the industries with 
limited capacity for mobility rather than the ones to whom the cost of relocation is small.  
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Targeting immobile or anchored elements of the industry within the direct regulatory approach is not 
unprecedented. For example, regulators in the EU decided to regulate hedge fund managers rather than 
hedge funds themselves, because, among others, it is more likely for the funds to be structured offshore 
and fall outside the jurisdiction of the regulator. In other words, the regulators decided to focus the 
regulation on the elements of the industry to whom the cost of relocation or regulatory arbitrage was 
higher.84 In this way, the regulation can prevent the relocation of players to loosely regulated financial 
markets. Again, putting criteria on (centralized) cryptocurrency investors or their sponsors can be 
considered as an example of such a strategy. 
In addition, to effectively address regulatory arbitrage, special attention should be paid to incentive 
effects of regulation, i.e., a regulation that imposes additional costs on the regulated industry should 
offset those costs by offering the industry benefits of being subject to a specific regulatory regime. 
Ceteris paribus, the regulatory system in which the marginal benefits of regulation equal its marginal 
costs can become arbitrage-proof. Therefore, the design of a regulatory regime for cryptoassets should 
result in an equilibrium from which cryptocurrency businesses have no incentive to deviate without 
making themselves worse off. 
Not to mention, there is no panacea for addressing regulatory arbitrage and all the attempts for doing 
so are imperfect and only can mitigate the problem imperfectly. So are the indirect regulation-based 
proposals. Eventually, a degree of global coordination might be necessary to effectively mitigate the 
risks of regulatory arbitrage in this context.85 However, indirect decentralized regulatory approach is 
susceptible to regulatory arbitrage to a lesser degree.86 Therefore, to face the challenges stemming from 
decentralized systems, it seems there is a need for certain levels of decentralization in the structure of 
regulation itself. For this restructuring to take place, there is no need for reinventing the wheel. Instead, 
regulation can be decentralized in a very traditional meaning of the term to deal with the problems 
arising from cryptocurrencies, irrespective of the degree of decentralization in the cryptocurrency 
ecosystem. Indirect regulation through credit institutions and payment systems and reliance on soft law 
in crafting international financial regulatory standards would be a promising way forward in avoiding 
potential problems stemming from regulatory arbitrage. 
Decentralized indirect regulation of cryptocurrencies  
The more interesting feature of indirect regulation that makes it particularly suitable for the regulation 
of cryptocurrencies is its relatively decentralized nature.87 In this respect, crafting appropriate indirect 
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regulatory mechanisms for cryptocurrencies requires identifying the financial institutions that have the 
most continuous and day-to-day relationships with them. Identifying these institutions means 
identifying those equipped with sufficient knowledge and understanding of the industry and their 
activities in financial markets.88 These are the institutions that can potentially be used as ‘surrogate 
regulators’ delegated with regulatory functions from government agencies. Furthermore, since indirect 
regulation of cryptocurrencies will be implemented by different multiple banks and payment 
institutions, it provides for the possibility of decentralized implementation and enforcement of rules 
which are initially applied to the banking and payment sector. 
The indirect regulation of cryptocurrencies will more closely resemble standards as opposed to rules.89 
This approach can transform rules-based regulation into principles-based regulation when credit and 
payment institutions - rather than the regulator itself - implement it. This is to say that precise rules 
made by the regulator and applied to credit and payment institutions will be transformed into standards 
in at least three aspects. First, the application, implementation, and enforcement of rules will be more 
decentralized and conducted by surrogate regulators. Second, rules will be applied with more flexibility, 
allowing for more variations in details and implementation. Third, rules will be applied with more 
discretion, making them resemble standards. In other words, indirect regulation is a means that can turn 
rules into standards when applied to the primary target of regulation.90 
For example, under the indirect regulation approach, central banks and other banking and payment 
regulators would regulate the entities or intermediaries enabling the interface and interaction between 
cryptocurrencies and fiat currency in cryptocurrencies schemes with the bidirectional flow.91 For certain 
transactions, especially in the realm of payments, indirect regulation, which targets intermediaries, is 
only possible in off-chain transactions where intermediaries are involved in the transaction. In contrast, 
due to the absence of intermediaries in most on-chain transactions, indirect regulation cannot target 
them. The intermediaries in off-chain transactions may include cryptocurrency banks and lenders, 
exchanges and wallet providers, custodians, and merchant acceptance facilities. For instance, for user 
protection purposes, account segregation requirements (separation of clients’ accounts) can be imposed 
on identifiable wallet providers, exchanges and custodians. As fractional reserve banking on bitcoin - 
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despite its specific problems - is likely to take off,92 financial institutions engaged in the fractional 
reserve banking on bitcoin may be treated as ordinary lenders and borrowers, only with a higher risk 
profile. Needless to say, higher prudential requirements would apply to such intermediaries to offset 
the higher risks of cryptocurrencies. For example, in implementing such a strategy, ring-fencing the 
traditional banking and payment systems can be considered as a policy option.  
As another example, a regulatory strategy aimed at reducing leverage in the cryptocurrencies ecosystem 
can do so by imposing leverage restrictions (including qualitative and quantitative collateral rules) on 
credit or payment institutions that engage in lending (both in fiat and cryptocurrency) to the market 
participants in the cryptocurrencies ecosystem. A cap on the bank’s leverage can be translated into 
effective but variable caps on cryptocurrency firms’ leverage to the extent they rely on credit institutions 
for borrowing. In this case, it is the credit institution that will allocate the credit to cryptocurrency firms. 
By doing so, instead of directly putting a limit on the leverage on the cryptocurrency industry, the 
regulator effectively delegates the allocation of credit to the banks that possess a superior knowledge 
of lending in general and the industry in particular. Although such a leverage requirement imposed 
originally by the regulator would operate as a rigid and non-discretionary rule for banks, it will have 
the flexibility of standards for cryptocurrency firms. This is because banks can customize the level of 
leverage and make loans to every cryptocurrency customer according to its financial standing and the 
bank’s own safety and soundness standards. In turn, cryptocurrency firms that value leverage the most 
would apply for more loans, and because banks are more efficient in monitoring borrowers, they will 
have more flexibility in allocating leverage or credit on behalf of regulators. Because cryptocurrency 
firms themselves, in turn, can lend to and borrow from each other, such a regulatory cap on credit 
institutions’ leverage can, in essence, take the form of ‘leverage cap and trade’. In the end, such 
discretion would provide flexibility in the allocation of loans or leverage to cryptocurrency firms and 
result in an effective cap and more efficient allocation of credit in the ecosystem.93 
In the following sections, the paper investigates the potential venues for indirect regulation. It first 
highlights the role of more recent technical developments and how they open up new opportunities for 
the indirect regulation of cryptocurrencies. Thereafter, it highlights the role of the banking and payment 
institutions in implementing such a regulatory strategy. 
Technical developments and new venues for decentralized regulation 
From its earliest days of bitcoin, scaling issues have been a constant concern for all the participants in 
the Bitcoin network, which led to significant developments and dividing controversies in the bitcoin 
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community. Two main camps emerged; one supporting vertical scaling solutions or the so-called 
second-layer solutions,94 the other supporting horizontal scaling solutions or increasing the current one-
megabyte block size.95 The ensuing civil war among the bitcoin community resulted in the failed 
SegWit2X, and a hard fork leading to the creation of bitcoin cash (BCH) and subsequent user activated 
soft fork (UASF) and the activation of SegWit in the legacy chain.96 Through time, it seems that within 
the bitcoin community vertical scaling solutions or the so-called second-layer solutions to address 
Bitcoin’s scalability problems is gaining traction.97 From among these new solutions, proposals for 
addressing scaling problems with the Bitcoin protocol such as the Lightning Network98 stand out.  
The second-layer solutions have already been in the making from the early days of bitcoin. Exchanges, 
bitcoin custody solution providers, and bitcoin debit card providers, which allow the internal or external 
transfers of bitcoin from a wallet to another within or across companies, can be considered as part of 
the second-layer scaling solutions for bitcoin. Furthermore, fractional reserve banking on bitcoin can 
act as a second-layer solution to address certain existing scaling problems. Banking on bitcoin is not a 
new idea and has been proposed even in the early days of bitcoin by some very early bitcoin users and 
developers as a scaling solution.99 In this view, banks would function as an additional layer on Bitcoin 
and the Bitcoin protocol itself would serve as the base or settlement layer for the net settlement of the 
financial obligations arising from the banking industry developed on top of Bitcoin. Upon realization 
of such developments, banks and payment service providers can directly or indirectly engage in the 
vertical layers of bitcoin by evolving into wallet providers, custodians, and nodes that support payment 
channels such as those of the Lightning Network.  
The second layer payment channels within the Lightning Network pose different challenges, such as 
liquidity risks that would warrant special scrutiny if banking entities would run full nodes on the 
Lightning Network. In addition, the transactions on the Lightning Network provide for higher levels of 
privacy than on-chain transactions do. Developments of this kind may warrant regulatory intervention. 
However, this time, due to lower levels of decentralization, the task of the regulator could be much 
easier and focused on the identifiable node operators on the network.  
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Wirdum, "The History of Lightning: From Brainstorm to Beta." 
99 Hal Finney, "Re: Bitcoin Bank," (December 30, 2010). 
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Regulating cryptocurrency through the banking system 
Regulating cryptocurrencies through banks may have various underlying rationales. It may be due to 
the customer or investor protection concerns, due to the financial integrity concerns, or due to the 
potential systemic risks concerns. Banks and cryptocurrencies have an uneasy relationship. On the one 
hand, there is a likelihood that the cryptocurrency business would grab part of the business of banking. 
On the other hand, to avoid such an outcome, banks may take an active role and engage in 
cryptocurrencies. The first line of business of traditional banking, which is more likely to fall victim to 
cryptocurrencies, is the payment service provision by banks, especially correspondent-banking model 
of international fund transfers. However, banks might take a proactive approach and coopt 
cryptocurrency business even in the provision of payment services. Bank involvement in 
cryptocurrencies could take various forms. The first role banks can play in cryptocurrency ecosystems 
is to function as an onramp for new entrants and investments in cryptocurrencies by providing banking 
services, in particular deposit or transaction accounts, to cryptocurrency business. In addition, banks 
may engage in offering cryptocurrency accounts or wallets or establish proprietary trading desks in 
cryptocurrencies or offer cryptocurrency Exchange Traded Fund (ETFs) or derivative products.100 Such 
activities can raise a few important regulatory questions. For example, should the regulator ban trading 
in cryptocurrencies for the banks or should it impose structural regulation, such as ring-fencing or 
subsidiarization? Given the liquidity risks in the cryptocurrency business and its derivatives, regulators 
would consider ring-fencing between proprietary trading in cryptocurrencies and other activities of 
banks to avoid cross-subsidization of cryptocurrency proprietary trading by the governments’ implicit 
and explicit subsidies to banks.101  
Cryptocurrencies are likely to affect the payment function of banks, however, the impact on deposit-
taking and lending would be minimal. Therefore, it is less likely that the maturity and liquidity 
transformation by banks would be disrupted by the cryptocurrency businesses. Although at the time of 
this writing, borrowing and lending cryptocurrencies are not taking place in the banking sector,102 this 
may be subject to change in the future. Therefore, further regulatory issues would involve the regulatory 
treatment of the engagement of banks in borrowing and lending in cryptocurrencies and the use of 
cryptocurrencies as collateral. For example, what safeguards should be in place to alleviate the risks of 
maturity and liquidity transformation in the absence of a lender of last resort (LOLR) with access to 
unlimited sources of liquidity?103 Additional prudential questions would be whether cryptocurrencies 
should be allowed to be used as collateral in the banking industry for secured financing. And if so, what 
quantitative and qualitative standards to be used for determination of haircuts in accepting 
                                                 
100 Nathaniel Popper, "Goldman Sachs to Open a Bitcoin Trading Operation," The New York Times May 2, 2018. 
101 See Hossein Nabilou, "Bank Proprietary Trading and Investment in Private Funds: Is the Volcker Rule a Panacea or yet 
Another Maginot Line?." 
102 Though some lending platforms engage in cryptocurrency lending and some exchanges do margin lending at the moment. 
103 Examples would be imposing prudential rules on lending, such as large exposure limits, interbank exposure, etc. 
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cryptocurrencies as collateral? How should the margins (initial and variation margins) be set on 
cryptocurrencies and their derivatives? Should there be special regulatory capital, leverage, and 
liquidity requirements for the exposure to cryptocurrencies? All these questions would open up venues 
for the regulation of cryptocurrencies indirectly by banking regulators. 
A major problem in cryptocurrency markets remains to be liquidity risks for the users. In addition to 
the technical limitations on the monetary policy embedded in the protocol, cryptocurrencies have only 
exchange value but little use value (intrinsic value). This means that in distressed times it is likely that 
liquidity issues would lead to large scale volatility. If banks directly or indirectly involve in liquidity 
provision in the cryptocurrency markets or are exposed to such liquidity risks, prudential measures 
should be set in place to protect the banking system. For example, if banks engage in fractional reserve 
banking on bitcoin, they would directly or indirectly be exposed to liquidity problems of 
cryptocurrencies. In this case, central banks as LOLRs would consider either cutting access to the LOLR 
service or imposing restrictions (or stricter liquidity standards) on the banks that engage in such 
activities. In the eurozone, the ECB is the de facto LOLR service provider (equivalent to Fed’s discount 
window) through the marginal lending facility.104 The reason that the ECB can be the LOLR is that it 
has access to unlimited sources of liquidity. The predetermined supply schedule and fixed money supply 
model of cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin remove the possibility of an ultimate liquidity provider or a 
LOLR.105 
Since the likelihood of the banking system engaging in cryptocurrencies would be the major source of 
systemic risk concerns in the future, banking supervisors can indirectly reduce the likelihood of risk of 
cryptocurrencies channeling through banking and payment systems by focusing on the prudential 
supervision of credit and payment institutions, rather than engaging in the regulation of 
cryptocurrencies themselves. For example, prohibiting banks from opening a bank account for 
cryptocurrency exchanges can stifle the growth of cryptocurrencies by creating roadblocks on the 
onramps to the cryptocurrency ecosystem. This would effectively function as the size limit or leverage 
limit on the cryptocurrency ecosystem as they would be deprived of the main sources of credit in the 
economy.106 
                                                 
104 This is made redundant by the introduction of fixed rate full allotment policy (FRFA). See Carlos Garcia-de-Andoain et al., 
"Lending-of-Last-Resort Is as Lending-of-Last-Resort Does: Central Bank Liquidity Provision and Interbank Market 
Functioning in the Euro Area," ECB Working Paper Series No 1886  (2016): 10. 
105 Although some proposals for stablecoins, such as Basis, allow such algorithmic central banking that provides for price 
stability using flexibility in money supply, it is unlikely that those stablecoin experiments would succeed in the presence of a 
credible CeBM. See: https://www.basis.io/. For a critique of this project, see Jemima Kelly, "The John Taylor-Backed 
“Stablecoin” That's Backed by, Um, Stability," Financial Times June 25, 2018. This project was shut down in December 2018, 
perhaps due to its shaky economic foundations. See Fabian Schär and Aleksander Berentsen, "Stablecoins: The Quest for a 
Low-Volatility Cryptocurrency," in The Economics of Fintech and Digital Currencies, ed. Antonio Fatás (London: CEPR 
Presss, 2019). 
106 For example, if the KYC/AML/CFT regulations would prevent banks from engaging in cryptocurrency businesses, 
cryptocurrency exchanges would have difficulty in opening accounts in the banks and hence would be deprived of one of their 
main gates through which the retail client’s money would flow into the cryptocurrencies. 
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Moreover, as mentioned earlier, technological developments open up further opportunities for indirect 
regulation as the banking system may perform different roles in, for example, the second-layer solutions 
of the Bitcoin network. As the scaling solutions for cryptocurrencies are being developed, it seems that 
the majority of the activities within the cryptocurrency ecosystem would migrate to second layers, and 
the protocol level would only be used for secure (deferred) net settlements (DNS). As participants in 
the second layers are likely to be banks, payment institutions and other financial institutions, the powers 
of the banking and payment supervisors in the supervision of credit institutions and payments system 
will be of utmost importance. Such developments not only necessitate new sets of regulation that should 
be imposed on banks but also turn the bank into suitable surrogate regulators through which the 
regulator can pursue its policy objectives by targeting the gatekeeping functions of a bank. In this sense, 
a majority of banking regulations would have their indirect impact on the cryptocurrency ecosystem.  
Regulating cryptocurrencies through payment institutions 
Recent developments in the EU and elsewhere in the world show that the payment institutions are 
increasingly involved in the cryptocurrency business.107 Risks in the payment systems mainly include 
credit risk, liquidity risk, operational risk, legal risk, and systemic risk.108 To address such risks, 
payment systems in Europe as part of the FMIs rests on an edifice of robust institutional and legal 
infrastructure. In addition to the laws and regulations regarding the retail payment systems, there is an 
established legal framework including ECB guidelines and decisions for the wholesale payment 
systems to address operational, liquidity and counterparty risks as well as settlement finality risks of 
such systems.109 However, the above mentioned legal framework does not apply to the payments made 
using cryptocurrencies.110 Therefore, such payments in their current form cannot be considered as a safe 
method of payment, not only due to the volatility of the settlement asset and probabilistic finality of the 
settlements but also because, unlike central bank money (CeBM), general acceptability of 
cryptocurrencies cannot be guaranteed.111 
Since the ultimate goal of many cryptocurrency schemes is to become a payment system112 either in 
parallel with the existing payment infrastructure or replacing them, and as some cryptocurrencies share 
                                                 
107 Hossein Nabilou, "The Dark Side of Licensing Cryptocurrency Exchanges as Payment Institutions," SSRN Working Paper 
Series  (2019). 
108 European Central Bank, The Payment System: Payments, Securities and Derivatives, and the Role of the Eurosystem 
(Frankfurt am Main: European Central Bank, 2010), 115-30. For an overview of legal risks in the use of cryptocurrencies as 
payment media, see Phoebus Athanassiou, "Impact of Digital Innovation on the Processing of Electronic Payments and 
Contracting: An Overview of Legal Risks," ECB Legal Working Paper Series No 16  (October 2017): 16-18. 
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110 Except those rules applicable to financial fraud or financial crime.  
111 European Central Bank, "Virtual Currency Schemes," 40. 
112 This is also acknowledged in the ECJ decision. “... the ‘bitcoin’ virtual currency has no other purpose than to be a means 
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many features of media of payments, they may fall within the regulatory ambit of the existing payment 
services regulation.113 In this respect, the rationale for regulation would be mainly about the integrity 
of the payment systems and safety of the transactions. However, the ultimate impact of cryptocurrencies 
on the payment system, it seems that this impact can both be positive and negative. On the one hand, if 
cryptocurrencies become a major method of payments in the future and sideline the official payment 
systems, their potential technological vulnerabilities could jeopardize the stability of the payment 
systems. An additional concern is that the fragmentation and lack of regulation and oversight over the 
decentralized payment system can lead to concentration of counterparty risks in payment hubs (e.g., on 
the Lightning Network) which would result in the fragility of the cryptocurrency payment system.114 
Furthermore, where cryptocurrencies are used as a settlement asset, the finality and irrevocability of 
payments cannot be legally guaranteed. This problem also exists at a technological level.115 On the other 
hand, a decentralized payment system can be more resilient in the face of natural disasters and other 
calamities. In addition, the coexistence of payment systems can increase payment system stability by 
creating an additional level of redundancy116 where in case of a failure of one system, there would be a 
second option. In other words, the proliferation of different methods of electronic payments and the 
addition of multiple levels of redundancies to the existing structures could result in a more robust 
payment system leading to enhanced financial stability.117 
Despite their benefits, cryptocurrency payments may be used for illicit purposes, the transactions could 
be subject to idiosyncratic technical risks and the users’ funds may be lost in the event of the failure of 
the middlemen facilitating the cryptocurrency transactions. For example, bitcoin payments are mainly 
gross and (near) real time.118 Hence, they may be subject to substantial liquidity risks. Concerns about 
liquidity risks have been raised about bitcoin in the sense that it is impossible to have full 
decentralization, fixed money supply, and sufficient liquidity simultaneously.119 Although 
cryptocurrencies would be prone to liquidity risks, as of yet, there has been no documented risks to the 
conventional payment systems posed by illiquidity in cryptocurrencies. However, the involvement of 
banks in cryptocurrency payment systems might result in risk spillovers from the latter to the former. 
                                                 
113 European Central Bank, "Virtual Currency Schemes- a Further Analysis," 27-28. See also Article 22 of the ESCB/ECB 
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From among the efforts aimed at bringing cryptocurrencies within the regulatory net, licensing 
requirement has been considered as the first natural step. However, it was not evident which type of 
license to be issued for engaging in cryptocurrency activities. In certain jurisdictions, such as in New 
York, where Bitlicense is issued, regulators decided to create a specific license for such activities.120 
Other jurisdictions opted for granting payment institution license to cryptocurrency exchanges. For 
example, in Luxembourg, Bitstamp Europe S.A. and bitFlyer Europe S.A., which provide the possibility 
of cross-border transfers of cryptocurrencies across wallets and across exchanges, are licensed as 
payment institutions.121 Licensing cryptocurrency exchanges as payment institutions is a regulatory 
strategy that is a first step in extending the existing regulations to the participants of cryptocurrency 
ecosystems. However, cryptocurrency payments are subject to idiosyncratic risks that cannot be fully 
addressed even assuming the full applicability of the payment services laws to the cryptocurrency 
exchanges. Two prominent examples of such risks are the risks associated with the illiquidity and 
volatility of the settlement asset in cryptocurrency payments, and the risks arising from the probabilistic 
finality of the settlements in blockchains relying on probabilistic finality.122  
Therefore, it seems that licensing cryptocurrency exchanges as a payment institution would do more 
harm than good in the long run. The alternative indirect regulation, i.e., directing the regulations towards 
the relationship of payment institutions and cryptocurrencies, would be a better strategy. Although 
under the current legal framework, direct intervention in the cryptocurrency markets may need 
extending the legal mandate of the existing regulators, the need for such an extension does not seem 
necessary at the time of this writing. The main reason being that the indirect tools at the disposal of the 
regulators are likely to address the potential risks stemming from the cryptocurrency ecosystem. 
Within such an indirect regulatory framework, a major venue through which cryptocurrencies can be 
regulated due to their interaction with the payment systems is through the regulators’ power of 
prudential supervision over credit institutions as banks engage in the provision of payment services. 
There are several scenarios in which banks might engage in payment systems using bitcoin or other 
cryptocurrencies. For example, as the second-layer payment solutions are being developed for bitcoin, 
banks might engage in the second-layer payment channels by running full nodes on the Lightning 
Network,123 essentially providing liquidity in bitcoin. Whether running such nodes and engaging in 
transactions in the second-layer payment channels mean that the bank engages in the provision of retail 
payment services and the application of payment laws should be triggered and whether the payments 
relayed through the blockchain qualify as wholesale payments system remain open questions. 
                                                 
120 New York Department of Financial Services, New York Codes, Rules and Regulations; Title 23, Department of Financial 
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Nevertheless, such developments open up new opportunities for indirect regulation of cryptocurrency 
payments through the banking system. 
Summary and conclusion 
This paper has been an endeavor in pursuit of the most efficient and effective regulatory strategies for 
regulating decentralized cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin. By taking the policy debate about regulating 
bitcoin a step further from whether to how to regulate bitcoin, the paper identifies two overarching 
regulatory strategies for regulating decentralized cryptocurrencies: centralized direct regulation and 
decentralized indirect regulation. It shows that centralized, direct, command-and-control regulation of 
cryptocurrencies face serious insurmountable challenges in regulating cryptocurrencies. They include 
limitations of competence on regulators, the fact that in certain cryptocurrencies there is no relevant 
responsible target institution towards which the edicts of regulation would be directed, and the problem 
of regulatory arbitrage that may thwart regulatory initiatives due to the features that are unique to the 
cryptocurrency industry.  
After highlighting the limitations of the centralized, direct, command-and-control regulation of 
cryptocurrencies, it argues that the focus of regulating decentralized cryptocurrencies should be shifted 
from the protocol layers towards the upper layers (i.e., application layers) upon which businesses are 
being developed. It is highly likely that the interface between the virtual and the real would be evolved 
around these layers where businesses would start building applications for micropayments and other 
payment purposes. As it is likely that certain levels of centralization in the upper layers would emerge, 
opportunities for regulators would come forth to direct the edicts and interdictions of regulations toward 
those entities, which are involved in the application layers of decentralized cryptocurrencies, through 
the banking and payment systems that can play the role of surrogate regulators. By the choice of 
standards over rules and granting discretion to surrogate regulators in the application of those standards 
to the cryptocurrency ecosystem, this indirect regulatory approach can achieve a level of 
decentralization that is likely to increase effectiveness and efficiency of regulation. This semi-
decentralized regulatory model, which is built on the concept of market-based, bottom-up and indirect 
regulation,124 is one of the most promising methods of regulation that could work with minimum 
regulatory costs and could avoid the inertia that hinders creating a new institutional framework for 
regulating cryptocurrencies. 
Given the innovative and idiosyncratic nature of bitcoin as being the first digital, divisible, 
denationalized, peer-to-peer and globally transferable store of value, and the potential layers of 
                                                 
124 See Colin Scott, "Accountability in the Regulatory State," Journal of Law and Society 27, no. 1 (2000).; Colin Scott, 
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innovative ideas that can be built upon it, an aggressive command-and-control approach to its regulation 
would stifle the potential future innovations that would be built upon Bitcoin’s protocol layer and that 
are hard to conceive of at the time of writing. Viewing Bitcoin as an evolving work-in-progress warrants 
a nuanced light-touch regulatory approach which is data dependent, defers to the virtues of 
experimentation, spontaneous discovery process125 and evolutionary dynamics in the financial 
system.126 In this perspective, one of the main advantages of decentralized model of regulation is that it 
is best suited to address the Hayekian knowledge problem as the regulation is more likely to rely on the 
existing market players, who have constant and day-to-day interactions with the industry, and are best 
suited to be knowledgeable about the constantly evolving cryptocurrency ecosystem. If adequate 
measures would be put in place to prevent regulatory capture, such a constant exposure would ensure 
that the rules and standards ultimately applicable to cryptocurrencies could be evolved in tandem with 
the evolution of the cryptocurrency ecosystem.  
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